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In management accounting, participatory budgets have become increasingly useful in 
decentralized companies. This type of budget allows managers to have more freedom to 
decide the allocation of resources and funds. However, this opens the door to dishonest 
behaviors among some managers and supervisors. This 2x2 quasi-experiment study uses 
the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality inventory to measure self-
reported honesty in business undergraduate students and to determine whether that 
measure correlates with dishonest reporting behavior. Participants played the role of 
managers of a division of a corporation and were asked to prepare a Direct Materials 
budget. Participants had the opportunity to maximize their personal profit by 
misreporting the actual unit price per product. Half of the participants were audited by a 
supervisor 5 out of the 10 experimental periods and the remaining subjects were not 
audited. The overarching hypothesis was that an individual’s score in the H-H factor and 
the presence of an audit will affect the budgetary reporting behavior. The results showed 
no correlation between these variables; however, there were many external, 
uncontrollable variables that may have affected this result. Despite these challenges, this 
study has been able to provide additional insight into the relationship between personality 
factors and managerial dishonesty, and whether the possibility of audit changes the 




When will Managers Lie? The Influence of Personality on Honest Budgetary 
Reporting by Measure with HEXACO-PI 
Participatory budgeting is the act of giving lower-level managers more 
responsibility in the creation of the budget for their specific area (Young, 1985). 
However, if the values and objectives of the manager differs greatly from that of the firm, 
then there is a chance of misreporting (Rankin et al., 2008). Some managers may attempt 
to serve their own interests and create budgetary slack though over reporting costs or 
understating revenue (Evans et al., 2001). Behavioral studies in managerial accounting 
research have sought to better understand why budgetary misreporting occurs. The 
purpose of this study is to discover if there is any relation between an individual’s score 
in the Honest-Humility factor of the HEXACO personality inventory and their decision to 
report budgetary slack. 
 The HEXACO-PI is a personality inventory that stems off from the Big Five 
Personality Inventory (Lee and Ashton, 2018). It modifies the existing factors and adds 
on a new factor called Honest-Humility. According to Lee and Ashton (2018), those who 
score high in the H-H factor “avoid manipulating others for personal gain” and “ feel 
little temptation to break rules”, while those who score low in the H-H factor are 
“inclined to break rules for personal profit” and “are motivated by personal gain.” This 
personality inventory was used for this study since it was shown by Lee and Ashton 
(2008) to accurately predict integrity.   
         I conducted a 2x2 quasi-experiment that employed a modified HEXACO-PI test 
and a task. Participants assumed the role of managers in a division of a corporation, and 
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made decisions related to a Direct Materials Budget for ten periods. This study also 
employed the use of an audit condition in which half of the participants received a 
message stating that they could be audited in five out of the ten periods. The dependent 
variable of interest is total slack produced, and if any correlation exists between that slack 
and to the audit condition and/or level of Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO-PI 
test. After analyzing the results, it was found that there was no correlation between the 
dependent and independent variable, but that may have been due to uncontrollable 
external factors.  
One unforeseen variable that affected the results was the COVID-19 pandemic 
that began in March 2020. This caused changes in the experiment that could have skewed 
the results. The first effect was the small sample size of this experiment, which could be 
due to the transition to an online survey as the experiment. Another unexpected effect 
was the probable lack of understanding of the task by the participants. Some participants 
chose to underreport when that action would cause them to lose their payouts. One cause 
of this could be the lack of in-person discussions on the directions and lack of 
opportunity for the participants to ask questions. Because of these effects and the results 
of this study, future research is warranted to fully understand the relation between 
personality and managerial reporting behavior with respect to honesty. With this 
information, companies can better understand why managers might behave in a certain 







         The research on the topic of participatory budgeting encompasses the cause of 
budgetary slack and why it occurs. This helps researchers understand participatory 
budgeting and how to effectively manage employees while mitigating potential issues. 
Academic accounting research frequently involves other fields of studies to support or 
enhance the research findings. This research falls into the category of behavioral 
accounting literature, which heavily relies on information from the field of psychology. 
Some of the major trends or findings in the literature that this paper focuses on is 
personality trait effects on behavior, managerial honesty in the workplace, and auditing or 
monitoring variables. 
Personality and Psychology in Accounting: 
In this study, one topic of interest is how personality traits relate to the occurrence 
of budgetary slack. Literature relating to this focus includes studies that use a 
personality/personal values inventory to see if budgetary decision making was 
affected.  Davidson (2019) studied social value orientation and its effect on honest 
reporting. He theorized that if a participant had a high score on the social value 
orientation assessment, then they would be more likely to have honest reporting 
behaviors. The social value orientation (SVO) assessment is a test that measures people’s 
consistent preferences toward outcomes for themselves and others. People can be 
categorized as pro-social (focus on the group) or pro-self (focus on the self). The results 
found that there was a positive correlation between pro-social personality traits and 
honest reporting behavior. Additionally, research done by Hobson et al. (2011) tested 
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participants on their personal values and found that those with high scores of empathy 
and traditional values tended to uphold honest behavior and view budget slack as a form 
of unethical behavior. Hartmann and Maas’s (2010) completed research on budgetary 
slack and how a person’s score on the Machiavellianism scale affects their responses. 
They specifically focused on when a superior manager pressures a controller to create 
budgetary slack. The results were that controllers scoring high on the scale were more 
likely to give into that pressure and create budgetary slack. 
         Another topic of interest found in the literature was using Kolhberg’s (1958) 
model of moral development to measure participants’ honesty. Kohlberg argued that the 
moral development stages started with morality in an individual being controlled by 
external factors and ended with control lying in internal factors. For example, Chung and 
Hsu’s (2017) research studied cognitive moral development and its effects on honesty in 
managerial reporting. They used an experiment adapted from Evans et al. and found that 
there was a positive and linear relation between cognitive moral development and honest 
reporting. An interesting aspect of this research is that they found this honesty occurred 
when there was no monitoring or audit aspect. 
         Another important topic in this field of research is that relating to social norms 
and how that can correlate to honest behavior. One example was a study by Altenburger 
(2017). He studied the effects of injunctive social norms and how it related to budget 
reporting. Injunctive social norms are those that one ought to do, while descriptive social 
norms are those that one does. They found that injunctive social norms influenced 
managers’ behavior because people conform to preferences of the group. However, 
Altenburger also found the effect of injunctive social norms decreased if there were 
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minorities in the group who preferred alternative preferences. This relates to my study 
because the participants are from the same academic class, and there may be different 
social norms within this group. 
HEXACO Personality Inventory 
There is significant literature that directly relates to the different psychological 
factors that can cause someone to act dishonestly in a business setting.  This study adds to 
the literature by using the HEXACO-PI, a variation of the Big Five Assessment, in order 
to operationalize honest personality and examine the effect it has on budgetary behavior. 
The Big Five, or the Five Factor Model of personality structure, organizes all 
personality traits into five large facets called Extraversion, Conscientiousness, Openness 
to Experience, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism (Costa and McRae, 1992). This model 
helped to standardize all personality traits into organized groups, but research by Lee and 
Ashton (2018) expanded upon this model and modified it in order to accurately measure 
honesty and humility in an individual’s personality. The cause behind this modification is 
due to these traits being previously grouped into the Agreeableness factor.  In order to 
remedy this, they created a variation of the Five Factor Model to include Honesty-
Humility as a sixth factor as well as modifying the existing factors (Lee, 2018). An 
important distinction to note is that the HEXACO model did not simply add the Honesty-
Humility factor; they edited the other factors as well so that the measure of personality 
was evenly spread between the factors. This variation is called the HEXACO Personality 
Inventory and it includes Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, Extraversion, Agreeableness, 
Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience. Lee et al. (2018) went on to test the 
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validity of the sixth factor by comparing the two models against an integrity test 
delivered to participants. Their results showed that the HEXACO model outperformed 
the Five Factor model in predicting the integrity scores of the participants. This study is 
one of the first to use the HEXACO model and its relationship with budgetary slack. 
Managerial Honesty 
Participatory budgeting is one of the most studied subjects in the field of 
managerial accounting (Brown et al., 2009). Evans et al.’s (2001) research on honesty in 
managerial accounting can be considered one of the founding studies on this specific 
topic. In their study, the authors examined managers’ preferences for honesty and wealth, 
and whether that affects managerial reporting behavior, specifically in participatory 
budget decisions. They conducted a series of experiments that targeted the factors that 
may cause honest or dishonest reporting, as well as providing evidence of how 
managerial honesty can affect the firm’s profits. They found that most participants 
exhibited honest behavior, even when they lost wealth by doing so. The researchers also 
found that managers generally do not lie more as the payoff for lying increases. However, 
there is a disagreement in the literature, as the studies previously mentioned show that 
this is not always the case, and individuals will sometimes take advantage of a situation 
where they can reap personal benefits. 
Audits and Monitoring 
An additional area in the budgetary reporting literature that is important to 
examine is the discussion of audits and internal control systems, and how they can affect 
honest behavior in managerial reporting. First, Hannan et al. (2006) studied the effects of 
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information systems on honest behavior of managers and found that the existence of 
these systems can generally increase manager honesty. However, under more precise 
information systems, managers tended to forego the benefits of appearing honest in favor 
of the benefits of misrepresentation. 
Rankin et al. (2008) studied managerial honesty by requiring managers to use 
factual assertion on their budget requests and found that less slack was created with this 
requirement. The factual assertion was that the managers were required to supply their 
budget request with support for their budget request. However, they also found that if the 
subordinate does not have final authority on the budget, meaning that the superior has the 
authority, then the slack increased. Their conclusion on the potential cause of this was 
that subordinates viewed the process as a negotiation, where self-interests reign, instead 
of an ethical dilemma. 
Cardinaels and Jia (2016) studied how audits affect incentives and peer behavior 
on misreporting.  They found that when reports were audited, the social norms of their 
peers had a strong effect on whether truthful reporting would occur or not. My study is 
unique in this aspect because it focuses solely on the individual rather than social norms 
that could normally affect it.  
Overall, this study fits into the literature by providing more insight on how 
personality traits can correlate to managerial reporting behavior. Next, I will examine 





Theory and Hypothesis Formulation 
When examining the reasons why an individual will behave in a certain way, 
different psychology theories can be used. My hypothesis states the relationship between 
an individual’s score in the Honesty-Humility factor of the HEXACO-PI, and the amount 
of budgetary slack created. Scoring high in the HH factor means that the individual can 
be described as honest in personality, and the opposite is true for scoring low in the HH 
factor. I employ an audit condition in this study, where roughly one half of the group will 
not be audited, while the other half will have a chance of being audited. 
The first theory to discuss would be the agency theory, which states that people 
are willing to lie in order to increase their personal payoffs (Young, 1985). Moreover, the 
theory states that if there exists any sort of incentive to misreport, then people will. 
Therefore, if there is no chance of any repercussions, then classical agency theory states 
that individuals will take advantage of that (Cardinaels, 2016). In my study, I hypothesize 
that those with low scores of H-H will follow the agency theory. 
Azjen (1991) founded the Theory of Planned Behavior, which states that a person 
will perform a behavior based on their intention to engage in such behavior, and the 
belief that they have complete control over their behavior.  Fishbein and Azjen (1991) 
describe intention as the measure of the probability that a person will perform a behavior. 
This intention is also influenced by what value the individual places in the behavior. My 
interpretation of this theory as it relates to this study is that if someone believes that being 
honest is the right thing to be and they have control over this aspect, then they will 
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perform honest behavior. Therefore, this theory is hypothesized to predict the behavior of 
participants who score high in the H-H factor.  
Lastly, our research uses the Theory of Reasoned Action, which was created by 
Fishbein and Azjen (1980) through scenarios observed by peers in their study. This 
theory states that behavioral intentions are affected by the social norms surrounding a 
behavior, an individual's attitude toward the behavior, and the perceived outcomes of the 
behavior. In Fleischman and Valentine’s (2019) research on outcome information and its 
effects on managerial honesty, they found that outcome information was positively 
related to behavior intention. Outcome information can be described as the information of 
the consequences of an individual’s actions, whether they be positive or negative. In our 
task experiment in the audit condition, the participants are told what their consequences 
will be if caught overreporting. My study uses this theory to hypothesize how participants 
will behave under the audit condition. 
This leads to our hypothesis formulation of the overarching H1 and the two sub-
hypotheses under H1 called H1a and H1b: 
H1: An individual’s score in the H-H factor and the presence of an audit will affect the 
budgetary reporting behavior. 
H1a: If individuals score high in the H-H factor, then the amount of budgetary 
slack will not be affected by the threat of an audit 
H1b: If individuals score low in the H-H factor, then the amount of budgetary 




Experiment Design and Procedures 
This research was a 2x2 quasi-experiment on 46 undergraduate university 
students enrolled in Principles of Accounting 2. The participants were asked to complete 
a thirty-five question personality test, complete a budget task, and give demographic 
information. The original procedure of the experiment had to be modified due to effects 
of the COVID-19 pandemic. In early March, universities across the country moved to 
fully online classes due to the pandemic, and all campus events were cancelled. Our 
original experiment was to be conducted in person, but I was required to convert this 
experiment into a Qualtrics survey due to university restrictions.  
The personality test used was shortened from the 60-item HEXACO-PI for survey 
brevity. The modified test became 35-item, and all ten statements from the factors 
Honesty-Humility, Conscientiousness, and Agreeableness were used. The remaining five 
questions were taken randomly from the other three factors. Two pilot studies were 
conducted in order to find if there was an acceptable variance between responses in the 
H-H factor. I found that most participants tended to respond with Neutral for the 
statements belonging to Honesty-Humility, so I changed the 7 point Likert scale to a 6 
point Likert scale, omitting the Neutral choice. Participants could answer with Strongly 
Disagree, Disagree, Slightly Disagree, Slightly Agree, Agree, or Strongly Agree. 
For the task instrument, I adapted the task from one of Evans et al.’s (2001) 
experiments that involved a direct trade-off between lying to maximize wealth, and 
reporting honestly. Participants received an online link to a Qualtrics survey that 
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contained the personality test and the task, with the order of these being randomized. For 
the task, the participants became the divisional manager of a manufacturing company. 
Their objective was to prepare the Direct Materials Budget for 10 periods with 100 units 
using a placeholder currency called Lira. The currency was used to set up a realistic 
scenario and dollar signs were used for simplicity. Before the survey was sent out, I used 
a computer simulator to roll 2 dice and the roll amount corresponded to a certain unit cost 
for the period between $5 and $6. The conversion chart can be found in the appendix. 
This unit cost will be the actual unit cost for the upcoming period. Therefore, the 
participant will know for certain what the unit cost will be for the period before they 
make their budget report. After reading the instructions, participants were given an 
example to show how they are reporting and how their earnings would be calculated. 
Participants would then report an estimated per-unit cost between $4.90 and $6.10 for 
their reported budget for each period. The estimated per-unit cost was multiplied by the 
100 units to be produced to obtain the estimated direct materials cost for the period. 
Similarly, the actual per-unit cost was multiplied by the 100 units to be produced to 
obtain the actual direct materials cost. The actual cost was subtracted from the estimated 
cost to find the budget slack. Any positive slack that was created was converted into 
dollars and given to the participant as part of their salary. I used a random number 
generator to pick Period 6 to calculate payouts by converting each participant’s excess 
funds and salary into real dollars. See the results and Figure 5 for the results of this 
calculation.  
There were two different variations of the task given. One variation did not have 
an audit conducted, while the other had an audit conducted on five out of the ten periods. 
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Periods 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9 were decided randomly after the experiment. The consequence 
for misreporting in the audit periods was given in the task instructions. If a participant 
was caught misreporting in the audit, they would not receive any of the positive slack, 
and their salary would be cut in half. The condition of audit and no audit were set up to 
be split evenly between participants. 
Participants’ anonymity was treated with care in regards to payouts. The original 
procedure was to assign participants ID numbers and run the payout calculations with the 
IDs. Then, a graduate assistant to the College of Business would be given this list of ID 
numbers and payouts and disburse funds. The graduate assistant would have no 
background on the research. However, this procedure had to be modified due to the 
transition to the online survey. I created two surveys where one survey had the task, 
while the other was used to collect the emails of the participants. I coded the first survey 
to assign each participant a random Response ID, and then I coded the second survey to 
pull the Response ID from the first survey. Therefore the first survey responses only 
contained the Response ID and the participant’s responses, and the second survey only 
contained the Response ID and participant’s email. After calculating the payouts for each 
participant, the graduate assistant was given the first survey’s Response IDs and 
correlating payouts, and the second survey’s results showing the connection between 
Response ID and emails. Then the graduate assistant connected the payouts and emails so 
that they could appropriately pay participants via email. Therefore, I would not be able to 





Post-Survey General Results 
The actual sample size for this experiment was 46 participants. 24 participants 
completed the No-Audit task and 21 participants completed the Audit-Task. One outlier 
was removed because they underreported each period, so I made the assumption that the 
participant did not fully understand the instructions. 
Measuring H-H 
Refer to Figure 1 in the appendix for the H-H factor questions mean responses by 
facet table. The questions relating to the H-H factor were organized by the underlying 
four facets: Sincerity, Fairness, and Greed Avoidance. All scores that required reverse 
scoring were modified in the data. Participants’ scores on the Honesty-Humility test were 
compared against each questions’ score mean and categorized into two groups: Low H-H 
and High H-H. 20 participants fell into the Low H-H category and 25 participants into the 
High H-H category. 
Measuring Slack       
Refer to Figure 2 in the Appendix for reporting frequencies by period. Each 
period had an average of 7 budgets that were under-reported. However, as the actual cost 
increased, the amount of negative slack increased. After reviewing each participant’s 
response, there were 19 people who did not lie, 11 people who overreported, and 15 
people who under and over reported across the periods.  I am unsure of why these 
participants chose to under-report, but one possible cause was that the participants may 
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not have fully read the instructions or did not fully understand the instructions. When the 
responses were modified to not include participants who under reported, it was found that 
36.7% strictly over reported and 63.3% reported honestly. One trend found by reviewing 
each individual response is that out of the group who strictly overreported, there was a 
wide variance in how much slack was produced. Some individuals would report on 5 
cents over, while others would report as high as they could.  
Figure 5 shows the payout frequencies of the participants. Since the payout period 
was #6, and the audited periods were 2, 3, 4, 8, and 9, then none of the participants were 
caught cheating. Thus, those who chose to report dishonestly were able to reap the 
benefits. Any negative slack was removed, so those who under reported only received the 
base salary. The conversion from Lira to Dollars was done by a .15 conversion factor. 
Therefore, if someone reported honestly and did not have any budgetary slack, then they 
would receive the base salary of 40 Lira. 40L * .15 = $8.00. Thirty participants received 
only the base salary, while 15 were able to receive more than the base salary. The highest 
payout was $24.00 
Testing Hypotheses 
To test the hypotheses, I used the Factorial ANOVA test. Refer to Figure 4 in the 
Appendix for that data. In the factorial ANOVA test, the Total Slack across the 10 
periods was set as the dependent variable, while the Audit Condition and H-H Category 
were set as the two independent categorical variables. The test produces a low R-squared 
value of .027, meaning that this model is not a good fit and does not explain the variation 
of the dependent variable of Total Slack. The audit condition variable had a significance 
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value of .782 and the H-H Score had a significance value of .969. The 2x2 interaction 
between HH-Category and Audit Condition had a significance value of .299. The 
interaction value can explain if the audit condition had different effects on the H-H 
category responses. With a set alpha-value of .05, it can easily be said that there is no 
correlation between Total Slack and the independent variables of Audit Condition and H-
H Score in this test.  
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
This research’s goal was to determine if there was any correlation or relationship 
between the Honesty-Humility factor and reporting behavior. It can be gleaned from this 
data that there is no correlation between the two. However, this could have been due to 
some external variables that were unexpected and uncontrollable. I believe that these 
were caused by the changes made due to the COVID-19 pandemic.   
One effect of these external variables was that the sample size of this experiment 
was smaller than expected, which may be attributed to the conversion from in-person to 
online. The expected sample size was between 58 and 60 participants, but only 46 were 
obtained. Another major effect is that the task instructions could have been unclear for 
some of the participants. In the original procedure, there would have been an opportunity 
for a Q&A discussion in order to increase participant understanding of the task. However, 
in the online procedure, the participants would have to email one of the researchers in 
order to ask a question. For similar experiments in the future, there should be a section of 
questions that gauges the participants’ understanding of the task. Because of this 
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confusion, some participants chose to both under and over report in the experiment. This 
means that any slack they gained in one period could have been cancelled out by a 
negative slack in another period, thus skewing the TotalSlack variable.  
One assumption of this study to consider is that the audit condition only had a 
chance of the audit being performed. This variable may have influenced behavior outside 
of what the research’s goal was. For example, a participant may have a high risk aversion 
and therefore may act in a different way than if the risk was eliminated. One assumption 
made in this study is that budgetary slack will always directly benefit the manager. In real 
life, budgetary slack may or may not directly affect the manager. The manager may be 
able to gain the excess slack by the form of embezzlement, or the slack may be used as a 
budget cushion and eventually be used for expenditures not related to business. This 
study solely focuses on if the manager were able to directly gain the budgetary slack. 
Future research on this topic is certainly warranted as there is still much to be 
found about personality and its relation to managerial budgeting. One topic of research 
would be to replicate the current study with the addition of gathering data on social 
norms and how they affect behavior in the workplace. If this study were repeated, some 
recommendations would include obtaining a larger sample size and define the audit to be 
certain. Overall, future research is warranted to continue to understand the relation 
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Appendix: Experiment Materials 
Audit Condition Task 
This experiment involves decision making in an organizational setting. Please read the 
instructions carefully because the amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make. Your monetary payoff is not affected by the decisions of any other 
participants in this experiment.  
 
During the experiment, it is important that you keep your decisions private. If you have 
any questions, please save your work and email the researchers before continuing on.  
During the experiment we will use an experimental currency called "Lira." The Lira you 
earn will be converted into dollars and you will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment. For the sake of simplicity, we will use dollar signs in the task.  
 
You are the manager of a division of a manufacturing corporation. You make a salary of 
40 Lira every period. Every period you must submit a budget request for direct materials 
of the products being produced in that period. This is called the Direct Materials 
Purchases Budget. Direct Materials to be purchased will always be 100 units.   
 
The researchers have electronically rolled two dice in order to determine the unit price for 
direct materials. The actual unit price for each period ranges between $5.00 to $6.00  
 
After this has been determined, you will report the Total Direct Materials Purchases. As 
the manager, you have the power to manipulate the unit price that you report on the 
budget. This means you can alter the unit price so that it can be above, below, or equal to 
the actual unit price. If there is any excess of Direct Material Purchases funds at the end 
of the period, then that excess will be kept by you as an addition to your salary. For this 
experiment, you can report as low as $4.90 per unit or as high as $6.10 per unit. 
 
*Please note that the corporate supervisor will implement an internal audit on the budget 
you submit. This will be done on 5 out of the 10 periods. If your reported per unit cost 
does not match the actual per unit cost, you will not receive any of the difference, and 
your salary will be cut in half. The researchers will randomize which 5 periods are 
chosen.* 
 
As a reminder, below is the calculation of the Total DM Purchases:  




You will repeat this budget preparation 10 times. We will then pick one period randomly, 
and whatever excess profit was made by the manager will be converted to actual dollar 

















































No Audit Condition Task 
 
This experiment involves decision making in an organizational setting. Please read the 
instructions carefully because the amount of money you earn will depend upon the 
decisions you make. Your monetary payoff is not affected by the decisions of any other 
participants in this experiment. 
  
During the experiment, it is important that you keep your decisions private. If you have 
any questions, please save your work and email the researchers before continuing on.  
During the experiment we will use an experimental currency called "Lira." The Lira you 
earn will be converted into dollars and you will be paid in cash at the end of the 
experiment. For the sake of simplicity, we will use dollar signs in the task. 
  
You are the manager of a division of a manufacturing corporation. You make a salary of 
40 Lira every period. Every period you must submit a budget request for direct materials 
of the products being produced in that period. This is called the Direct Materials 
Purchases Budget. Direct Materials to be purchased will always be 100 units.   
 
The researchers have electronically rolled two dice in order to determine the unit price for 
direct materials. The actual unit price for each period ranges between $5.00 to $6.00  
 
After this has been determined, you will report the Total Direct Materials Purchases. As 
the manager, you have the power to manipulate the unit price that you report on the 
budget. This means you can alter the unit price so that it can be above, below, or equal to 
the actual unit price. If there is any excess of Direct Material Purchases funds at the end 
of the period, then that excess will be kept by you as an addition to your salary. For this 
experiment, you can report as low as $4.90 per unit or as high as $6.10 per unit. 
 
Please note that the corporate headquarters will not know the actual unit price for the 
period, but only what you report on the Direct Materials Budget.  
 
As a reminder, below is the calculation of the Total DM Purchases:  
Direct Materials to be Purchased       x  Unit Price       = Total Direct Materials Purchases 
 
You will repeat this budget preparation 10 times. Then you will turn your documents into 
the researchers. We will then pick one period randomly, and whatever excess profit was 





Task Example Problem:  
 
Here is an example problem to demonstrate the instructions. Numbers in bold are those 
that you must complete yourself. The following is an example problem to how you may 
determine the profit received by the manager. In this situation, the actual unit price was 
$5.50. As the manager, you decided to report that the estimated unit price was $6.10. 
 
Period: 1  
 
Direct Materials to be Purchased 100 units 
X Unit Price determined by dice $5.50 by roll of 7 
= Total Actual Direct Material Purchases 100 units x $5.50 = $550 
 
What unit price will you report on the Direct Materials budget report?        $6.10         
 
 
Direct Materials to be Purchased 100 units 
X Unit Price Reported $6.10 
= Total Reported Direct Material Purchases  100 x $6.10 = $610 
 
Profit to Manager = Total Reported DM Purchases - Total Actual DM Purchases  
                            = $610 - $550 



















Q1: The actual per unit cost for Period 1 is $5.80. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q2: The actual per unit cost for Period 2 is $5.50. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q3: The actual per unit cost for Period 3 is $5.60. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q4: The actual per unit cost for Period 4 is $5.30. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q5: The actual per unit cost for Period 5 is $5.90. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q6: The actual per unit cost for Period 6 is $5.30. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q7: The actual per unit cost for Period 7 is $5.10. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q8: The actual per unit cost for Period 8 is $5.20. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 
this period is 100 units. What per unit cost will you report in your budget? 
 
Q9: The actual per unit cost for Period 9 is $5.50. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 




Q10: The actual per unit cost for Period 10 is $5.50. The estimated per unit cost that you 
will submit to your supervisor must be between $4.90 and $6.10. The number of units 






Q1: What gender do you identify as?  
o Male    
o Female   
o Nonbinary/Genderfluid   
o Prefer not to say    
 
Q2: What is your age?  
________________________________________________________________ 
 
Q3: Classification  
o Freshman   
o Sophomore   
o Junior   
o Senior  
 
 














Personality Statements, Organized by Factor: 
Honesty-Humility 
 Sincerity: 
• I wouldn't use flattery to get a raise or promotion at work, even if it thought it 
would succeed (HH1) 
• If I want something from someone, I will laugh at that person's worst jokes 
(HH5) 
• I wouldn't pretend to like someone just to get that person to do favors for me 
(HH8) 
Fairness: 
• If I knew that I would never get caught, I would be willing to steal a million 
dollars (HH2) 
• I would never accept a bribe, even if it were very large (HH6) 
• I'd be tempted to use counterfeit money, if I were sure I could get away with it 
(HH9) 
Greed Avoidance 
• Having a lot of money is not especially important to me (HH3) 
• I would get a lot of pleasure from owning expensive luxury goods (HH10) 
Modesty 
• I think that I am entitled to more respect than the average (HH4) 
• I want people to know that I am an important person of high status (HH7) 
Agreeableness 
 Forgiveness 
• I rarely hold a grudge, even against people who have badly wronged me 
• My attitude toward people who have treated me badly is "forgive and forget"  
Gentleness 
• People sometimes tell me that I am too critical of others  
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• I tend to be lenient in judging other people 
• Even when people make a lot of mistakes, I rarely say anything negative  
Flexibility 
• People sometimes tell me I'm too stubborn 
• I am usually quite flexible in my opinions when people disagree with me 
• When people tell me that I'm wrong, my first reaction is to argue with them  
Patience 
• People think of me as someone who has a quick temper  
• Most people tend to get angry more quickly than I do  
Conscientiousness  
 Organization 
• I plan ahead and organize things, to avoid scrambling at the last minute 
• When working, I sometimes have difficulties due to being disorganized 
Diligence 
• I often push myself very had when trying to achieve a goal 
• I do only the minimum amount of work needed to get by 
Perfectionism 
• When working on something, I don't pay much attention to small details 
• I always try to be accurate in my work, even at the expense of time  
• People often call me a perfectionist  
Prudence 
• I make decisions based on the feeling of the moment rather than on careful 
thought 
• I make a lot of mistakes because I don't think before I act  






• I can handle difficult situations without needing emotional support from 
anyone else 
Openness to Experience  
Aesthetic Appreciation 
• I would be quite bored by a visit to an art gallery  
Extraversion  
Social Boldness 
• I rarely express my opinion in group meetings 
Sociability 
• The first thing that I always do in a new place is to make friends 
Liveliness 
• On most days, I feel cheerful and optimistic  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
